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Abstract  
We analyze micro and macro drivers of coverage ratios, as well as of their components, in a cross-
country sample of European banks. Among the former, we find that credit risk variables, including 
forward-looking indicators, are the most relevant bank-specific factors explaining bank coverage ratios, 
together with the level of capitalization in high-NPL banks. Among the latter, coverage ratios increase 
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1. Introduction  
One of the most debated issues in Europe since the financial and sovereign debt crises concerns 
the accumulation of large stocks of non-performing loans (NPLs). Excessive stocks of NPLs can limit 
banks’ lending ability and even impair the monetary policy mechanism (Draghi 2017; ESRB, 2019). To 
tackle this issue, a number of micro and macro policy initiatives have been adopted at both European 
and national level (ECB, 2016 and 2017a).1  
Because NPLs represent a risk to banks’ balance sheets insofar as they are not sufficiently 
covered (Constâncio, 2017), several of the recent actions entailed measures to enhance the coverage 
ratio, i.e., the share of loan loss reserves (LLRs) to total NPLs. Such ratio indicates how much the credit 
risk associated with the loan portfolio is covered through the accumulation of loan loss provisions. The 
higher the coverage ratio, the lower the net book value of the loan, hence the potential loss associated 
to the loan and ultimately, the impact on capital once the loss materializes.  
Over the last years, the coverage ratio has gained relevance as a key supervisory metric to 
assess banks’ soundness, if not as a fully-fledged supervisory tool, prompting the need for a more 
uniform loss coverage policy across banks and countries.2 This has happened in parallel with a 
strengthening of prudential rather than accounting priorities as for the rules governing banks’ loan loss 
reserves.  
Despite the increased policy relevance of coverage ratios, the empirical evidence on 
determinants of coverage ratios remains scarce. Previous works on related topics have focused on 
explaining either NPLs or loan loss provisions (LLPs).3 However, provisioning policies are virtually 
uncorrelated with coverage ratios (see Table 1) and, thus, previous findings on the determinants of 
provisioning or NPLs cannot fully explain the dynamics of coverage ratios, which is a more 
comprehensive indicator of balance-sheet strength. In this work we aim to fill this gap. In particular, we 
                                                             
1 In 2017 and 2018, the European Central Bank (ECB) published for the first time guidelines on how banks should set internal 
NPL coverage thresholds (ECB, 2017b and ECB, 2018). In 2019, a new European Union (EU) regulation complemented existing 
prudential rules by requiring a deduction from own funds when NPLs are not sufficiently covered by provisions (see Stamegna ,  
2019 for a review of major initiatives). 
2 For example, large institutions have commonly reported lower coverage ratios than small and medium -sized banks. At the 
country level, the average coverage ratio in Europe is nearly 46%, but it ranges from 24% in Finland to ne arly 70% in Hungary. 
What is more striking is that many of the countries with the highest level of NPLs report below -average coverage ratios (EBA, 
2018). 
3 Previous studies on LLPs discuss the role of discretion (Liu and Ryan, 2006; Bushman and Williams, 2 012; Norden and St o i a n , 
2013; Beatty and Liao, 2014, and literature therein), as well as their timeliness and contribution to procyclical lending (Hu izinga  
and Laeven, 2019; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Nicoletti, 2018). Berger and De Y oung (1997), Nkusu 
(2011), Klein (2013), and Beck et al. (2015) among others study the determinants of NPLs.   
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exploit the high variation of coverage ratios across banks and countries and investigate the main drivers 
of coverage ratios, as well as of their determinants, both at the micro and macro level. 
We use a sample of around 440 large and medium-sized banks in Europe over the period 2010–
2017. Europe provides an interesting case study, given the high level of NPLs and the substantial bank 
and country heterogeneity in the region (EBA, 2018). Time variation is ensured by the inclusion of the 
euro sovereign crisis and the post-crisis years, a relatively long period marketed with a slow recovery.  
We start with analyzing the role of bank-specific factors related to credit risk, capitalization, and 
performance, among others. We find that credit risk considerations, and in particular asset quality, as 
measured by NPL levels and changes, and lending growth are the most relevant factors explaining 
coverage ratios. Higher NPLs induce banks to set aside higher reserves, but in a way that is not sufficient 
to determine higher coverage ratios. We also show that the relationship between coverage ratios and 
asset quality is non-linear, as high-NPL banks tend to be comparatively better covered as asset quality 
worsens. Moreover, we find that risky banks tend to have lower LLRs and coverage ratios if they are less 
capitalized. This supports the capital management hypothesis, indicating that weaker banks tend to 
under-reserve, possibly to limit the negative implications of higher provisioning on equity (Ristolainen, 
2018). 
Second, to better understand whether coverage ratios respond also to a prudential rationale, 
we investigate whether banks consider forward-looking considerations when setting them. We find that 
credit growth, although being accompanied by reduced NPLs in the very short run, is associated with 
both more prudent provisioning and higher coverage ratios. We also uncover that forward-looking 
measures of asset quality are associated with higher coverage ratios. This evidence suggests that 
coverage ratios work more as prudential (forward-looking) buffer than temporary (and backward-
looking) booking accounts. It also suggests that even in an “incurred loss” model (ILM) for calculating 
bank provisions, banks tend to manage coverage ratios in a forward-looking manner. 
Third, we find evidence of peer effects in setting coverage ratios. This is to be expected as 
benchmarking is a common practice among practitioners and supervisors. In particular, we find that 
banks with coverage ratios below their country average tend to increase their coverage ratios more than 
peers (or decrease them less), and this effect is stronger for banks that are farther away from the 
average.  
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In the second part of the analysis, we analyze the role of systematic macro determinants of 
coverage ratios related to the business and the financial cycle as well as to relevant structural 
characteristics of a given country. Our first key finding is that coverage ratios increase with GDP growth, 
and decrease in recession, pointing to a countercyclical behavior.  
The second finding is that more stringent macroprudential policy is associated with higher 
coverage ratios. In particular, we find that interventions on time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning 
and corporate taxation are generally the most effective tools to increase coverage ratios. We also find 
that increasing loan collateralization by setting limits to borrowers’ loan-to-value ratios is associated 
with higher coverage ratio, indicating that collateral and coverage ratios are complementary rather than 
substitute tools.  
The third finding is that in more risky countries actions to improve the rule of law are associated 
with lower NPLs and (to a lesser extent) coverage ratios. This evidence indicates that a stronger contract  
enforcement or more efficient courts help banks resolve NPLs.  
Finally, when we investigate the role of the NPL secondary market, we uncover higher coverage 
ratios in banks located in countries where secondary markets for distressed debt are larger, and the 
more so if banks are located in high-NPL countries. This result corroborates the statements by European 
central authorities about the need to report adequate coverage ratios to make loan disposals more 
likely and limit actual losses for the seller (Fell et al., 2016; Constâncio, 2017).   
Our results have a number of policy implications. First, the result that capital is positively 
associated with coverage ratios stresses the importance of linking capital regulation with coverage ratio 
policies, in particular in countries or banks with high NPL levels. Well capitalized banks should be better 
positioned to build higher coverage ratios, although, as our results suggest, tighter capital rules may 
delay the accumulation of LLRs. This result is in line with the finding in Gropp et al. (2019) that banks 
tend to deleverage in an attempt to comply with more stringent capital regulation.  
Second, the analysis of the macro drivers of coverage ratios suggest that stricter supervision is 
relevant, but addressing structural factors (e.g., by developing the secondary market for loans or 
reinforcing the legal framework) is at least equally important to ease the disposal of legacy assets, hence 
reducing the denominator of the ratio more quickly and at a lower cost.  
Finally, our empirical analysis pre-dates the entrance into force of the new accounting standard 
(IFRS 9). The introduction of a forward-looking and ideally countercyclical approach to calculate 
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provisions should lead to higher coverage ratios, by promoting a timelier and more prudent 
provisioning. In this respect, we provide evidence of a prudent behavior in setting coverage ratios 
already before the entry into force of IFRS 9. Hence, we expect our results to carry through the new 
approach.  
Our work differs from the existing literature on bank provisioning in various respects. Our main 
variable of interest is the stock of LLPs accumulated over the years (LLR) in percentage of NPLs rather 
than the flow of LLPs. We therefore explore bank and country level factors by including a large set of 
micro and macro-level variables drawn from the literature on NPL determinants (e.g., Berger and De 
Young, 1997; Nkusu, 2011). Among the country variables, we analyze the importance of the institutional 
framework as well as the development of a secondary market for NPL assets, in addition to the typical 
focus on GDP growth and pro-cyclicality in previous studies (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Huizinga 
and Laeven, 2019). This allows us to exploit the richness of country characteristics and thus, better 
explain the large variation in coverage ratios across countries. As we investigate the dynamics of 
coverage ratio components, we are also able to explore the mechanisms through which banks protect 
themselves against credit losses in response to shocks. This allows us to draw some conclusions on 
whether coverage policies are driven by accounting rather than prudential considerations and which 
policy measures may help foster coverage ratios. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background details 
on the main measures taken to enhance loss coverage for NPLs and the reasons why, in a context of 
high NPLs, it is important for banks to build up adequate coverage ratios. Section 3 illustrates the data 
and provides descriptive statistics for our sample. Section 4 and 5 investigate empirically the main 
sources of variation in coverage ratios and their components. We first focus on micro-level factors 
(Section 4) and then extend the analysis by using macro-level data (Section 5). Section 6 concludes. 
2. NPLs and coverage ratios: institutional background  
2.1. Recent measures to enhance loss coverage for NPLs 
NPLs have recently become a key priority for macro-prudential authorities in Europe because of 
the potential negative externalities associated with large stocks of troubled assets (ESRB, 2019). High 
NPLs are potentially detrimental to individual banks and the financial system for several reasons. First, 
an unresolved stock of NPLs may have negative externalities on the perception of the health of the 
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financial system, making bank funding more expensive and discouraging banks from new lending. 
Second, lending can be impeded as banks with poorer asset quality may seek to regain adequate capital 
ratios by deleveraging and cutting back on lending rather than by raising new equity. Third, high NPL 
ratios can also distort managers' incentives if troubled loans increase moral hazard and favor excessive 
risk taking because of eroding bank capital (Bruno and Marino, 2019).  
NPLs in European banks skyrocketed to unprecedented levels in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, making them more vulnerable than their international peers to the repercussions of poor asset 
quality. European supervisors have reacted fiercely to resolve the problem of legacy assets. As a result 
of these actions, according to the EBA, the NPL ratio of EU institutions has decreased from 6% as of mid-
2015 to 3% as of mid-2019. Nevertheless, discrepancies across banks and countries still persist, the 
aggregate level of NPLs in EU banks remains very high (over 600 billion euros as of June 2019), and the 
gap versus international peers is striking (according to World Bank data, the NPL ratio was nearly 1% in 
the US as of end 2018).  
As argued (Constâncio, 2017), one of the reasons behind this large variation has been the 
absence of common provisioning practices, motivating measures on how to both harmonize 
provisioning practices and enhance loss coverage (Stamegna, 2019; ECB, 2019). Promoting not only 
higher but also more homogeneous coverage ratios is important for supervisors who commonly rely on 
benchmarking and peer comparison.4  
To strengthen the supervisory approach to NPLs, in March 2017, the ECB released guidelines on 
how to manage and provision for problem loans, complemented with quantitative indicators on the 
minimum levels of prudential provisions, based on the vintage and the degree of collateralization of the 
non-performing exposures (ECB, 2018). In July 2018, the ECB announced the decision to set bank-
specific supervisory expectations for the provisioning of NPLs as part of the supervisory dialogue. The 
aim was to harmonize the degree of loss coverage over the medium term across comparable banks. In 
March 2018, the European Commission adopted a comprehensive package of measures that included a 
proposal to introduce common minimum coverage levels for newly originated loans that become non-
performing. In April 2019, an amendment to the European capital regulatory framework, the ‘prudential 
                                                             
4 For example, in its guidance on NPLs (ECB, 2017a), the ECB claims that best practices “are intended to constitute ECB banki ng  
supervision's expectation” (p. 5) and that “where possible, indicators related to the NPL ratio/level and coverage should also be 
appropriately benchmarked against peers in order to provide the management body with a clear picture on competitive 
positioning” (p. 30). 
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backstop’, required banks to have minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures and to deduct 
from own funds (common equity tier 1 capital) those not sufficiently covered.  
To complete the picture, the accounting standard IFRS 9, introduced as of January 2018, has 
changed the impairment recognition by requiring banks, in essence, to make larger and timelier 
provisions based on the amount of “expected losses”.5 Until the introduction of IFRS 9, banks in most 
European countries accumulated provisions according to a backward-looking approach, reflecting 
“incurred” credit losses (Cohen and Edwards, 2017).  Ideally, under the new accounting standard, 
provisions should be better able to anticipate deteriorating economic conditions that may affect 
borrowers’ ability to repay. In such a way, they could be effectively used to cover expected losses, while 
bank capital serves as a buffer against unexpected losses (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003).  
The switch to the new standard has been an important step to reconcile the perspective of 
accounting standard setters and those of bank regulators and supervisors. Losses on NPLs are in fact 
subjected to both accounting standards and prudential regulation which (especially before the IFRS 9 
introduction) adopt different perspectives. The former emphasizes transparency of financial statements, 
the latter emphasizes safety and soundness. Given the accounting rules, LLPs have an overall 
detrimental effect on earnings and regulatory capital.6 Because LLPs are at the discretion of bank 
managers, there is potential for banks to provision more or less than necessary as a way to smooth their 
income and capital. From an accounting perspective, this would introduce discretionary modifications to 
earnings and reduce comparability across firms (Walter, 1991). On the other hand, from a prudential 
perspective, higher provisioning may reflect a more cautious approach to building up large reserves 
prior to future losses.  
2.2. Coverage ratio as a prudential tool 
The initiatives illustrated above show that the coverage ratio has gained relevance as a key 
prudential and monitoring tool to shield bank balance sheet. Why it is desirable for regulatory and 
                                                             
5 There are some exceptions. Notably, Spanish bank regulators introduced a forward –looking provisioning regime in 2000, 
meant to address procyclicality issues, which led to more timely and higher general provisions (de Lis et al., 2001; Jiménez et al., 
2017).  
6 The actual effect on bank capital of provisioning is hard to determine, because the regulatory implications of provisions var ies  
according to the approach used by banks for calculating capital requirements, and on the nature of bank provisions. The  Ba s el  
capital framework distinguishes between general provisions and specific provisions. General provisions are provisions held 
against future, presently unidentified losses that are freely available to meet losses which subsequently materialize. Provis i ons  
ascribed to identify deterioration of particular assets are specific provisions. By their nature, general provisions qualify  for  t he  
inclusion in Tier 2, although with certain limitations (Bruno and Carletti, 2017).  
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supervisory purposes to promote high loan loss coverage? The answer is that adequate coverage ratios 
can help banks mitigate most of the concerns associated with high NPLs. 
First, adequate loan loss allowances enhance banks’ safety and soundness (Wheeler, 2019). 
Provisioning is a credit risk management tool through which banks alleviate credit risk by setting aside a 
given amount (LLPs) as a buffer to absorb expected losses associated with a loan. LLPs allow banks to 
recognize the estimated loss in their profit and loss account, even before the actual loss can be 
determined with accuracy and certainty. The stock of LLPs accumulated over years form LLRs. When 
loan losses eventually materialize, banks can ideally draw on these reserves, thereby absorbing the 
losses without impairing capital - to the extent that credit risk is not under-estimated and allowances 
eventually results adequate to cover for the actual loss. This preserves banks’ capacity to provide credit 
to the economy (Beatty and Liao, 2011).7  
It should be emphasized however, that in principle low coverage ratios do not necessarily imply 
under-provisioning or delayed recognition of losses, as they might reflect rigorous lending practices, 
strong insolvency frameworks, or high collateralization level (EP, 2016).  
In practice, however, especially in a context of generalized poor asset quality, low coverage 
ratios represent a potential source of instability, in that any future loss on the loan portfolio, if not 
sufficiently provisioned for, would be covered by bank capital. This would occur also for collateralized 
loans, as the net-present value of the collateral is highly affected by the enforcement procedure that in 
several countries is lengthy and costly (Constâncio, 2017). In light of these considerations, banks with 
large volumes of NPLs and moderate coverage ratios would be more vulnerable to negative shocks 
affecting borrowers’ credit quality, especially in crisis years.8  
The second reason why high coverage ratios are important policy tools is that they contribute to 
make banks’ balance sheet less opaque. In the traditional banking literature  (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983), loans are illiquid and untraded contracts generating cash flows that are hard to predict. In the 
absence of a true market price, the loan fair value is approximated through the process of provisioning. 
The process of accumulating provisions is, in fact, equivalent to reducing the face value of the loan to its 
                                                             
7 The NPL Guidance stresses the importa nce of timely provisioning related to NPLs, as “these serve to strengthen banks’ 
balance sheets, enabling them to (re)focus on their core business, most notably lending to the economy” (ECB, 2018).  
8 Estimates report that net present value of NPLs may be a s may be as low as 40-50% of the loan gross book value. Balance 
sheets are protected, and capital buffers remain impaired, as long as coverage ratios reflect this haircut. Of course, the 
estimates are affected by several factors, including the cost of enforcing collateral through the legal system and NPL invest ors’  
risk appetite (Fell et al., 2016).     
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present value, taking into account the allowance built up over time (Song, 2002). If loan loss allowances 
were underestimated, bank assets and capital ratios would be overvalued and balance sheets would be 
distorted.  
Relatedly, because high loan loss coverage corresponds, de facto, to low loan net book value, it 
follows that reporting high coverage ratios is also a precondition to make the asset disposal more likely 
and reduce the bid-ask spread between sellers and buyers (Fell et al., 2016). However, anecdotal 
evidence and market practices show that, on average, coverage ratios in European banks are still 
inadequate if compared to actual recovery rates or haircuts applied as an effect of NPL resolution.9 This 
points to the importance of increasing coverage ratios in order to reduce the negative impact of credit 
losses on capital.   
3. Data and summary statistics 
We collect annual bank-level data from the S&P Global Market Intelligence Platform (S&P 
Global). The dataset spans the years 2010–2017 and covers all EU countries as of 2017.10 Following Eber 
and Minoiu (2016) we collect data at the highest consolidation level. To avoid including too small banks 
that could introduce noise, we only keep banks that are being classified as medium-sized and large 
according to the ECB definition.11 Given the purpose of the analysis, we delete institutions whose 
commercial banking business is negligible.12 All micro-level variables are winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%, 
respectively.13 The final sample contains 441 banks, representing around 70% of banking assets in 
Europe (see Table A.1 for a detailed breakdown of our sample).  
Figures 1 to 4 explore trends in NPLs, loan loss reserves, and coverage ratios based on our 
sample. Figure 1 shows that the evolution of the average coverage ratio over all countries and in high-
                                                             
9 In the context of the NAMA, the asset management company established in Ireland in 2009, assets were priced with a 57% 
haircut, with an average haircut on loan portfolios ranging from 43% to 61%. In the case of SAREB, the Spanish asset 
management company established in 2012, total assets were valued with a 53% haircut, with large discrepancy by loan type 
(Medina Cas and Peresa, 2016). Looking at Italy, the recovery rate on NPLs is estimated between 41% (Carpinelli et al., 2016) 
and 47% (Ciavoliello et al., 2016), indicating an average haircut of about 60%.  
10 As common in the empirical literature on European banks (see Altavilla et al., 2017), German banks ar e over-represe nt ed  i n  
terms of number of institutions in our sample. However, this is not the case in terms of total banking-sector assets. This reflects 
the highly fragmented nature of the German banking system.  
11 The ECB labels as large those institutions with assets greater than 0.5% of total consolidated assets of European Union banks  
and medium–sized as those with assets between 0.5% and 0.005%. 
12 We delete institutions with a loan-to-asset ratio and a deposit-to-asset ratio smaller than 20%, those not classified as ‘ba nk’ 
or ‘savings bank/thrift/mutual’, as well as those that, although being classified as banks by S&P Global, may operate not in a 
pure commercial manner because for example of ownership (e.g., government -owned banks) or scope (e.g., asset management 
companies). 
 
9 
 
NPL countries, defined as those with NPL/TA above the sample mean.14 In both groups of countries, 
coverage ratios have trended up since the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–2012 and, again, after the entry 
into operation of the SSM in 2014. Overall, European banks have progressively increased their coverage 
ratios, partly as a managerial response to asset quality deterioration, partly due to stricter supervisory 
and market scrutiny.  15 Throughout the period, high-NPL countries report coverage ratios below the 
sample average. The gap has progressively narrowed over time. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the 
components of the coverage ratio, scaled by total assets. By comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 on the 
evolution of coverage ratio and its components, it emerges that while the dynamics of LLRs and NPLs are 
similar, they are radically different from those of coverage ratios.  
Figures 3 to 4 confirm the presence of large cross-sectional variability in asset quality and 
coverage ratios, respectively, both across countries and across banks within the same country (see also 
Table A.1).16 Figure 3 shows that countries with higher average NPLs also have a larger dispersion in 
NPL/TA across banks. Looking at Figure 4, it is possible to detect some positive correlation between the 
size of the NPL stock and the dispersion of coverage ratios in a given country, but not as clear-cut. By 
comparing the two figures, no obvious country-level mapping emerges between the quality of bank 
loans and the level of coverage. This suggests that heterogeneity in European banks’ coverage ratios is 
not explained by differences in asset quality.17  
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables are shown in Table 2 and Table A.2, 
respectively. The average sample bank is large according to the ECB definition with assets amounting to 
nearly euro 28 billion and is a traditional commercial bank, whose core business is lending (the average 
loan to asset ratio is 65%) and whose main source of funds are customer deposits (the deposits to assets 
ratio averages 66%). As far as bank asset quality is concerned, the NPL to total asset ratio averages at 
about 4%. The average coverage ratio is 51%, with large variation across banks, the minimum coverage 
                                                             
14 Our definition of high-NPL countries is time-varying, with some countries coming in only for part of the sample. All countries 
in which the NPL ratio exceeds 10% in 2016 (in accordance with the definition of the ESRB, 2017b) ar e consistently covered. 
These countries are the following, in order of descending NPL ratio: Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia, Ireland, Bul g a r i a,  
Hungary, Romania, and Croatia.   
15 This may have been due to stricter supervisory and regulatory scru tiny in relation to the AQR exercise, increased market 
pressure, as well as a deterioration of collateral values (Council of the European Commission, 2017).  
16 We are aware that across jurisdictions and banks there may be different definition of NPLs (Baudi no et al., 2018). However, a 
common definition for non-performing exposures was introduced in 2014 by the EBA. Moreover, our regressions include bank 
and country fixed effects that should absorb the variation in coverage ratios due to possibly different de finitions across ba nks  
and jurisdictions. 
17 An EBA report on NPLs also shows that the correlation between these assets and coverage ratios is low over time, with a 
correlation coefficient close to 0 at least since September 2014 (EBA, 2016).  
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ratio being 10% and the maximum 89%. These numbers are comparable to those reported in aggregate 
statistics (ECB, 2016; EBA, 2018). 
Looking at measures of bank capitalization, the CET 1 regulatory capital ratio is on average 15%, 
well above the Basel III minimum requirement of 8.5% including the capital conservation buffer. Note 
that the European banking sector has taken a number of steps to strengthen its resilience since the 
onset of the euro debt crisis. The ROOA averaging around zero confirms that low profitability remains a 
major source of concerns for European banks and that high NPLs have been an important cause of low 
profitability in European banks (Altavilla et al., 2018).18   
Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics for the set of macroeconomic and macrofinancial 
indicators we consider. These include business cycle indicators such as real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate, as well as the short term interest rate, and variables related to the financial cycle, 
such as asset price growth (i.e. house and stock prices), and the private credit to GDP ratio. We also 
include two indices to account for the regulatory and judicial environment, namely the Regulatory 
Quality index and the Rule of Law index, both published by the World Bank. Finally, we consider some 
indicators from the Cerutti et al. (2017) macro-prudential policy dataset. A description of these macro 
variables is given in Section 5. 
4. Exploiting the cross section of banks: micro-level analysis 
In this section, we exploit the sample heterogeneity at the micro-level in order to explore the 
link between coverage ratios and bank-specific characteristics.  
Because higher coverage ratios may entail larger provisions and/or lower NPLs, we first draw on 
the literature on determinants of LLPs and NPLs when investigating the drivers of coverage ratios. We 
illustrate all these factors and formulate hypotheses. 
We then test which of the above bank-specific characteristics, together with other factors, can 
explain variation the coverage ratio. We will run three separate regressions, whose dependent variables 
are the coverage ratio and its components. Looking simultaneously at coverage ratios and its 
components will enable us to better understand the mechanisms by which banks set coverage ratios, 
over and above the accounting identification of impaired loans.  
                                                             
18 “The return on equity remains below the cost of equity with legacy assets, cost –efficiency and banks' business models still 
being some of the main obstacles towards reaching sustainable profitability levels". (EBA, 2018) 
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4.1. Determinants of NPLs, provisioning and coverage ratios 
We begin by discussing the main micro-determinants of NPLs, i.e., cost efficiency, bank 
capitalization and lending policy (see Klein, 2013 and literature review therein). Berger and De Young 
(1997) motivate the effects of cost efficiency on loan-portfolio quality under the bad management and 
the skimping hypotheses. The former argues that low cost efficiency is a signal of poor management 
practices, thus implying lower portfolio quality as a result of poor loan underwriting, monitoring and 
control. On the contrary, under the skimping hypothesis, high cost efficiency is associated with higher 
NPLs in the future, as it reflects little resources allocated to the monitoring of lending risks.  
Capitalization is another important factor influencing bank risk taking. In principle, well-
capitalized banks should be better able to expand their business and take on risk. On the other hand, the 
“moral hazard” hypothesis (Keeton and Morris, 1987) argues that undercapitalized banks are more 
prone to gamble for resurrection and respond to moral-hazard incentives by increasing the riskiness of 
their loan portfolio. Relatedly, undercapitalized banks are more likely to keep lending to zombie firms 
compared to stronger banks (Schivardi et al., 2018, and literature therein). This behavior in turn results 
in higher non-performing loans on average in the future. 
Lending policy is a determinant of NPLs in that, ceteris paribus, banks more willing to invest their 
funds in loans (rather than, e.g., securities) are more exposed to credit risk (Keeton and Morris, 1987). 
Excessive credit growth may also be conducive to more risky lending, and hence to higher NPLs in the 
future (Jiménez and Saurina, 2006; Huizinga and Laeven, 2019). 
Considering bank provisioning, the literature identifies (non-discretionary) factors related to 
credit risk considerations and (discretionary) factors accounting for different management objectives 
(Beatty and Liao, 2014). Concerning the former, the non-discretionary component of LLP would reflect 
losses emerging from the lending business. The first plausible driver affecting provisions and loan loss 
reserves is the quality of the loan portfolio. Both the level of NPLs and the change in the quality of the 
underlying loan portfolio may explain provisioning policies. Ceteris paribus, one may expect poorer asset 
quality to be associated with higher loan loss reserves, as banks with lower asset quality should be more 
prone to increase loss coverage for the reasons discussed in the previous sections. Relatedly, the 
relevance of the lending business as well as changes in the size of the loan portfolio are additional 
potential factors affecting loan loss reserves (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012; Nicoletti, 2018).   
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As far as the discretionary components of provisioning are concerned, previous studies argue 
that bank managers may exploit discretion in provisioning to smooth income and to manage capital 
(see, among others, Liu and Ryan, 2006 and Beatty and Liao, 2014, and literature therein). Including 
forward-looking judgments on future expected credit losses into LLP, however, is also considered a 
discretionary behavior (Bushman and Williams, 2012). 
The income-smoothing hypothesis in loan loss provisioning states that banks provision during 
times of higher earnings in order to smooth profits over time: when earnings are low, provisions are 
deliberately understated to mitigate the adverse effect of other factors on earnings, in contrast to 
situations when earning are thought to be high. Therefore, under this income-smoothing behavior, 
banks’ provisioning policy may be used to minimize the variance of reported earnings. The result would 
be a systematic under (over) provision in banks with low (high) profits.  
As for capitalization, according to the traditional view on accounting discretion and capital 
management, capital-constrained banks may have an incentive to use provisions to achieve regulatory 
capital targets (Andries et al, 2017). This occurs because provisions, by reducing earnings, have a 
mechanical negative effect on banks’ capital. Hence, this argument points to a positive relationship 
between capitalization and provisioning, as weak banks would have the incentive to hold back on LLPs in 
order to preserve regulatory capital. If this is the case, lower capitalization should be associated with 
reduced provisions. Capital management of this kind reduces provisioning procyclicality, as bank 
capitalization rates are more likely to be stressed during economic downturns (Huizinga  and Laeven, 
2019). 
The above-mentioned factors draw on the literature on the determinants of NPLs and 
provisioning. There are, however, additional motives and bank characteristics that could possibly explain 
the variation in coverage-ratios. 
Regarding the role played by capitalization, an alternative view to the capital-management 
hypothesis would justify the existence of a negative nexus between coverage ratios and regulatory 
capital. In this view, the two balance-sheet items are substitutable buffers against potential losses. 
When raising capital is too costly, lower-capitalized banks may have the incentive to increase LLRs to 
partly compensate for their lack of capital (Norden and Stoian, 2013). Or, to change perspective, better 
capitalized banks would be in a more comfortable position to absorb shocks prompted by the 
13 
 
deterioration of the loan portfolio. As such, these banks should have less incentives to report high 
coverage ratios. 
Banks’ funding structures could also influence coverage ratios in that low asset quality might 
compromise banks’ ability to borrow by making them more risky and opaque (Bruno and Marino, 2019). 
As discussed in the institutional background section, higher coverage ratios can mitigate the concerns 
associated with NPLs by buffering risk and enhancing transparency. One therefore may expect that 
banks more exposed to market discipline have more incentives to report higher coverage ratios 
compared to banks less subjected to investors’ scrutiny.  
4.2. Baseline specification and main results 
We now test how bank level characteristics influence banks’ coverage ratios. To shed light on 
the mechanisms by which banks set coverage ratios, we estimate three sets of regressions. Our key 
dependent variable is the coverage ratio, i.e., the amount of LLRs over the stock of NPLs. We also use its 
components, the LLRs and the NPLs (both scaled by total assets), as additional dependent variables in 
separate models. In all three cases, we estimate the following panel fixed effects model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜇 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘,𝑡 ,     (1) 
where i = 1, …, N, k = 1, …, K and t  = 1, …, T , with i being the bank, k being the country, and t  being the 
year. The vector X ik ,t–1  includes bank-level covariates to account for the factors discussed above (i.e., 
asset quality, lending policy, cost efficiency, profitability and capitalization) and other bank specific 
factors (i.e., size and funding structure) that can be relevant in determining the coverage ratio and its 
components. 19  
Our preferred measure of asset quality is the ratio of NPLs over total assets. We also test 
whether not only the NPL stock, but also the change in NPLs matters in explaining provisioning and 
coverage ratios. In the spirit of Bushman and Williams (2012), we distinguish non-discretionary from 
discretionary provisioning, by including the lagged asset quality variables (to account for observed 
changes in portfolio performance), as well as the change in NPLs in t + 1 (to account for potential future 
losses) in one specification.  
                                                             
19 NPLs include the subcategories of bad loans,  unlikely-to-pay exposures and past due exposures. Commonly, loan loss 
coverage differs according to the subcategory considered (being the highest for the riskiest sub -category made of bad loans). 
Unfortunately, the breakdown of the NPL aggregate is unavai lable for most banks in our sample.  
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To gauge the effect of lending policy, we use gross loans to total assets, and the loan-growth 
rate to capture the speed of the credit expansion and the risk-taking motive (Huizinga and Laeven, 
2019). 
We assess the potential influence of profitability and test the income-smoothing hypothesis by 
using the return on average assets (ROAA). As a further measure of bank performance, we also include 
the cost-to-income ratio to proxy cost efficiency and test the bad management hypothesis vis-à-vis the 
skimping hypothesis.  
To capture the capital-management motive, we use the CET 1 capital ratio. The ability to absorb 
unexpected losses makes common equity the highest quality and most costly component of banks' 
regulatory capital.  
We control for size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, as aggregate statistics 
show that smaller banks tend to report higher coverage ratios (EBA, 2018). More generally, prior 
research has shown that size is a relevant determinant of lending and risk taking (see Kishan and Opiela, 
2000, among others), and therefore it may also explain banks’ coverage ratios and their components.  
To capture the role of funding structure, we include the ratio of customer deposits to assets. In 
line with Calomiris and Kahn (1991), we assume that banks with a larger share of demandable debt are 
more exposed to market discipline and, therefore, have more incentives to report high coverage ratios 
compared to banks less relying on deposits. 
All explanatory variables (with the exception of the change in NPLs and loan growth) are lagged 
by one year to mitigate concerns about reverse causality. The equation includes bank and country-time 
fixed effects (μ i  and 𝛾𝑘,𝑡, respectively). The latter accounts for country-time-specific characteristics, 
which we will investigate in depth in Section 5.  
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Table , presents the results for the baseline investigation on the main micro drivers of NPLs, LLRs 
and coverage ratios in Columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. To start with determinants of NPLs (Column 1), 
lending policy, cost efficiency and profitability are important dimensions in explaining variation in asset 
quality. As expected, a larger size of the loan portfolio is associated with higher credit risk (Keeton and 
Morris, 1987; Klein, 2013). On the other hand, higher (contemporaneous) loan growth is associated with 
lower NPL ratios. This finding suggests that, in the short run, credit growth may be beneficial in terms of 
asset quality, possibly because credit expansion is more likely in boom periods (when NPLs tend to be 
lower), or because it can temporarily relax borrowers’ financial constraints. Another explanation is that, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in the loan base may imply a simultaneous increase in banks’ assets (the 
denominator of the NPL ratio), while the new loans will eventually become non-performing at a later 
stage. This would leave the current NPL stock unchanged in the short run. In line with this interpretation, 
evidence from previous studies points to a negative effect of past excessive lending (captured by lagged 
credit growth) on the quality of the loan portfolio. Specifically, Jiménez and Saurina (2006) and Klein 
(2013) show that the (detrimental) effect of credit growth on asset quality becomes significant after at 
least four and two years, respectively. This evidence suggests that rapid credit growth today results in 
lower credit standards that, eventually, bring about more problem loans only in the medium run.  
We also find that higher profitability is strongly associated with lower NPLs. This finding suggests 
that better-managed banks report, on average, higher asset quality, corroborating overall the “bad 
management” hypothesis. At the same time, we find that lower costs are associated with higher NPLs, 
as predicted by the skimping hypothesis.  
Focusing on Column 2, we find that asset quality, credit expansion and profitability have a key 
role in explaining banks’ LLRs. As expected, and in line with e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2019), there is a 
strong positive relationship between the stock and the change in NPLs and LLRs. Consistent with 
previous evidence (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012; Nicoletti, 2018), we also find that higher credit growth 
is associated with larger LLRs despite the fact that (at least in the short run) credit expansion is 
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associated with lower NPLs. This result suggests that, when the loan portfolio expands, banks prudently 
set loan-loss reserves aside by anticipating higher (potential) future losses, and this independently of the 
positive effect of credit growth on NPLs in the short run. In Columns 4 and 5, we investigate more 
directly whether banks incorporate forward-looking judgments into coverage ratios by include the 
change in NPLs at t + 1. We find a strong positive association between this forward-looking measure of 
asset quality and coverage ratios.20  
Profitability is another important driver of LLRs. Contrary to the “income smoothing” hypothesis, 
we uncover a significantly negative relationship between profitability and LLRs. This result is in line with 
the “bad management” hypothesis: because better-performing banks report lower NPLs, there is less of 
a need for them to set aside higher LLRs. It also provides support for the procyclical behavior of bank 
provisions (see Huizinga and Laeven, 2019, among others).  
Focusing on Column 3, we find that asset quality, credit growth, and profitability are significant 
explanatory variables for coverage ratios. Interestingly, banks with poorer asset quality and increasing 
NPLs generally exhibit lower coverage ratios. Although banks tend to react to higher NPLs by increasing 
LLRs, such an increase does not seem adequate to compensate for the larger amount of NPLs. On the 
contrary, banks experiencing higher credit growth report higher coverage ratios, in line with the results 
on the coverage ratio components.  
Higher levels of profitability are associated with lower coverage ratios. It seems that banks with 
higher profits prefer to either distribute dividends or accumulate capital (through retained earnings) 
rather than increase provisioning and setting aside higher reserves. Because profitability and GDP 
growth tend to be positively related (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003), this finding may also reflect a 
procyclical behavior by which banks tend to increase coverage ratios when profits decrease, e.g. during 
recessions. 
Finally, we find that capitalization and funding structure play a limited role in explaining the way 
banks shape coverage ratios. The effect of capitalization on coverage ratios and its components is 
insignificant, while we find a mildly positive effect of customer deposits on coverage ratios (significant at 
the 10% level) providing some support the ‘market discipline’ hypothesis (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).21  
                                                             
20 In untabulated results, available upon request, we replace the change in NPL at t+1 with the lead of the NPL to total asset 
ratios. The positive effect on coverage ratios is confirmed.  
21 A positive association between the deposit to asset ratio and coverage ratio is also in line with Drechsler et al. (2 0 1 8 ).  The y 
argue that deposits effectively behave as term liabilities because banks are able to exert market power. They thus optimally 
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Overall, results from our baseline specifications outline the relevance of credit risk 
considerations for coverage ratio dynamics. High or increasing NPLs induce banks to set aside higher 
reserves, but in a way that is not sufficient to determine higher coverage ratios. On the contrary, credit 
growth as well as forward-looking NPLs are associated with more prudent provisioning and hence higher 
coverage ratios. This finding points to a forward-looking behavior of banks in setting coverage ratios. 
Profitability is also an important driver of coverage ratios and its components, but contrary to previous 
work on the discretionary components of bank provisioning, our evidence does not support the income-
smoothing hypothesis. Likewise, we find no evidence supporting the capital-management motive. 
Next, we explore the differential behavior of banks with very poor asset quality. Expected losses 
should be higher at banks that are already experiencing high-NPLs. As such, these banks should be more 
in need of setting up higher coverage ratios to protect their balance sheets. On the other hand, because 
provisions to loan-loss reserves would further reduce earnings and capital, weaker banks may have 
more incentives to under-provision for potential losses (Ristolainen, 2018). We include the high-NPL 
bank dummy indicating banks with the NPL/TA ratio in the top decile of the sample distribution, and its 
interaction with asset quality, CET1 ratio, and ROOA. Results in Columns 6 and 7 show that while lower 
asset quality is in general associated with reduced coverage ratios, in high-NPL banks this correlation is 
reversed, pointing to a non-linear relationship between asset quality and coverage ratios. While banks 
are generally unable (or unwilling) to adjust their loan-loss allowances at the same pace as asset quality 
deteriorates, banks facing a very high level of credit risk try more to restore an adequate level of 
coverage ratios, the worse the quality of their assets. This evidence is suggestive of the existence of a 
‘floor’ for coverage ratios, which high-NPL banks try not to breach, possibly owing to supervisory 
pressure or peer effects (see Subsection 4.3).  
Turning to profitability and capitalization, one would expect them to play a more important role 
for high-NPL banks. Given that higher provisions translate into lower earnings and, ceteris paribus, lower 
equity, restoring adequate levels of coverage ratios should be more costly for very risk banks, which are 
already threatened by the negative effects of NPLs on profits and capitalization.  First, we uncover that 
the negative correlation between profitability and coverage ratios is significantly more negative for very 
risky banks. This implies that high-NPL banks tend relatively more to use profits in other ways than to 
increase LLRs, compared to the average bank, which results in more procyclical coverage ratios for these 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
invest into (risky) long-term assets. Hence, the positive correlation between deposits and coverage ratios could reflect some 
bank assets’ characteristic not directly captured by our variables.  
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banks. Second, unlike in the baseline regression, capitalization plays a significant role in explaining LLRs 
and coverage ratios in very risky banks. Consistently with a capital-management (capital smoothing) 
hypothesis, this evidence indicates that banks facing a very high level of credit risk tend to accumulate 
higher LLRs, and hence higher coverage ratios, if they are better capitalized. Or, when capitalization 
decreases, high-NPL banks tend to reduce coverage ratios, possibly to limit the negative implications for 
equity of higher provisioning. 
As robustness checks (see Table A.3), we replace our asset quality indicator with the NPLs to 
total loans ratio, the ROAA with the return on average equity (ROAE), the CET1 ratio with the Tier 1 ratio 
and the CET1 over NPLs ratio. Results remain unchanged.  
4.3. Do banks catch up to their peers? 
In this subsection, we explore whether banks adjust coverage ratios due to peer-imitation 
behavior. Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that banks adjust their coverage ratios “to catch up 
to their peers”, and therefore, for reasons unrelated to the quality of their loan portfolios.  Financial 
reports for banks are widely published, so determining the amount of reserves held by peer banks is a 
simple matter (Walter, 1991). Peer comparison is, in fact, one of the most widely used methods of 
assessment employed by professional analysts as well as by individual investors. Supervisors as well 
tend to monitor and assess banks against their peers. In doing so they favor imitating behavior. 
Empirical analysis also confirms that herding in financial markets is a common phenomenon (see Rajan 
1994, among others).22 If herding behavior occurs, one reason why banks adjust their coverage ratios is 
to be aligned to their peers.  
To test this hypothesis, we replace our preferred dependent variable by the change in the 
coverage ratio. We measure peer-imitation behavior in terms of the absolute deviation of a given bank’s 
coverage ratio to a benchmark represented by the average coverage ratio of the country that a bank is 
located in. To calculate the average coverage ratio in each country, we rely on official ECB statistics. In 
the same regression, we investigate whether banks from high-NPL countries behave differently in this 
respect. 
The regression model therefore becomes: 
                                                             
22 Rajan (1994) find evidence of herding behaviour in loan loss provisioning and charge offs i n New England banks over 1986–
1992, after correcting for changes in observable fundamentals. 
19 
 
Δ (
𝐿𝐿𝑅
𝑁𝑃𝐿
)
𝑖𝑘,𝑡
= 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇 𝑖 + 𝛾𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽1|𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1| + 𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3|𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1| × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘,𝑡, (2) 
where Δ (
𝐿𝐿𝑅
𝑁𝑃𝐿
)
𝑖𝑘,𝑡
is the change in coverage ratio, defined as  (
𝐿𝐿𝑅
𝑁𝑃𝐿
)
𝑖𝑘,𝑡
−  (
𝐿𝐿𝑅
𝑁𝑃𝐿
)
𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1
. On the 
right hand side, 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1  is a dummy that equals 1 for banks with their coverage ratios below their 
respective country average; |𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1| × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1  is the interacted term between the absolute 
deviation and the below-country average dummy. 
As reported in Table 4, because banks may behave differently according to whether they are 
undercovered (relative to their peers), we include the absolute deviation from the country average and 
its interaction with the below-country average dummy. Our findings suggest that banks that compare 
more unfavorably to their peers try to catch up, by increasing their coverage ratio more or decreasing it 
less, and the more so the more they are distant from the target. To explore the mechanism, banks with 
below-average coverage ratios tend to conform by both increasing LLRs more (or decreasing them less) 
and resolving a larger stock of NPLs, the relevant coefficients being highly significant also in those 
cases.23  
5. Exploring macro-level data 
In this section we exploit the richness of country characteristics to better explain the large 
variation in coverage ratios across countries. We first consider a large set of macroeconomic and 
financial variables, as well as several measures of the stringency of the institutional framework. We then 
expand on the role of secondary markets for distressed loans. 
5.1. Baseline specification and main results 
The explanatory variables’ set includes a broad range of macroeconomic and financial variables 
derived from the literature on NPL determinants (Nkusu, 2011; Klein, 2013; Beck et al., 2015) and 
provisioning procyclicality (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Beatty and Liao, 2014). In particular, GDP growth 
and the unemployment rate are used as indicators of general macroeconomic performance. Changes in 
                                                             
23 It should be noted that the identification of peer effects is challenging, as it is subject to the reflection problem (see Le ary and 
Roberts, 2014). In essence, it is difficult to identify whether banks adjust their coverage ratios in response to their peers’ 
coverage ratios, or in response to some other characteristics of their peers, or even owing to an omitted factor influencing t he  
decisions of all banks in a given country. As for the latter case, we include a large set of country-specific variables to minimize 
the risk of omitting relevant factors. We leave to further research the distinction between the two channels through which 
herding behavior takes place.  
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house and stock prices would help explaining differences in asset quality, e.g. via wealth effects among 
borrowers or via a decreased value of collateral. The private sector credit-to-GDP ratio, measuring the 
aggregate debt burden of households and businesses, reflects to some extent banks’ risk-taking 
behavior. Finally, monetary policy may also influence asset quality and loan loss coverage policy.  
Since the quality of governance can affect provisioning behavior and the incentives for banks to set 
coverage ratios, we also consider the following three dimensions: macroprudential stringency, 
regulatory quality and rule of law.24 To analyze the role played by macroprudential policy, we include 
the 2018 update of the country-specific prudential measures derived from the Cerutti et al. (2017) 
macro-prudential policy dataset. We start with the broadest index available in the dataset, the so-called 
Macroprudential Index. It covers three borrower-targeted and nine financial-institution-targeted 
instruments, therefore taking on values between 0 and 12, where 0 means that none of the instruments 
is in place and 12 means that all of them are in place. Hence, the higher the index, the more stringent 
the implementation of macroprudential measures in the respective country. We then replace the index 
by some of its subcomponents. Based on anecdotal evidence (Walter, 1991) and prior research on the 
effects of macro factors on banks provisioning (Jiménez et al., 2017 and Andries et al., 2017, among 
others), we focus on those ones that are more likely to affect banks’ coverage ratios, namely measures 
on provisioning policies, capital buffers, taxation, and limits to borrowers’ loan-to-value ratio.  
In the spirit of Andries et al. (2017), we include a measure of regulatory quality capturing the 
government’s ability to formulate and implement policies and regulations, as well as an index proxying 
the strength of the rule of law, which captures agents’ confidence in rules, and the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights and courts. Higher values of the indices indicate better regulatory quality 
and more effective enforcement of rules and provisions. Both indices are published by the World Bank, 
based on an annual survey. Table 2 reports aggregate statistics for all the macrovariables included in the 
analysis. 
Again, we estimate the following regression having LLRs, NPLs and coverage ratios as dependent 
variables in separate models:  
𝑌𝑖𝑘,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘,𝑡,     (3) 
                                                             
24 An analysis on the role of micro-prudential supervision, focusing on the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism is 
presented in Appendix B. In line with Ristolainen (2018), we find that SSM supervised banks have overall more incentives to 
recognize NPLs and adjust loan-loss coverage accordingly. 
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where 𝑋𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 includes lagged bank-level variables as illustrated in previous sections and 𝑍𝑘,𝑡 comprises 
the lagged time-varying macro-level factors described above. We saturate the specification with time 
and bank-level fixed effects.  
As far as micro-variables are concerned, for the sake of space, in Table 5 we only report the NPL 
to total asset ratio and the loan growth rate, which remain explanatory variables for the coverage ratio 
and its components also when accounting for systematic macro factors.  
Looking at the macro variables, we find evidence of a decoupling of LLR and coverage ratio 
dynamics. In particular LLRs tend to be larger when NPL stocks are also larger, that is at times of high 
unemployment, in an effort to stabilize coverage ratios (Nkusu, 2011; Klein, 2013). However, coverage 
ratios show a countercyclical behavior, as they tend to be higher when GDP growth is higher.25 Owing to 
the disconnect between growth and labor market dynamics, particularly evident in the 2008-2011 
period, our finding points to a prudent banks’ behavior in setting higher coverage ratios even before the 
economic conjuncture worsens. As expected, higher private indebtedness is associated with higher NPLs 
and coverage ratios, although the significance of this result is limited. 
Macro-prudential regulation (see Columns 1, 3 and 5) turns out to be the most important factor 
shaping coverage ratio, together with the business cycle. Next, in Columns 2, 4 and 6 we focus on 
specific macroprudential tools. As expected, the indicator on time-varying/dynamic loan-loss 
provisioning is positive and significant, indicating that when specific measures to address pro-cyclical 
provisioning are in place, banks are better able to build up higher loan loss allowances and coverage 
ratios to face asset quality deterioration. Increasing taxation on financial institutions is also associated 
with higher coverage ratios, plausibly because the higher deductions associated with larger provisions 
can reduce taxable income (Andries et al., 2017).26 Setting limits to borrowers’ loan-to-value ratios, i.e., 
increasing loan collateralization, does not seem to influence banks’ loan loss coverage.27  
In Table 6 we include the high-NPL country dummy, to account for banks from countries with an 
above sample average level of NPLs. All things being equal, banks from countries affected by high levels 
of NPLs may behave differently from the average sample bank. In particular, most of the countries 
affected by high NPLs levels have weaker institutional frameworks, where for instance foreclosure 
procedures are particularly lengthy and costly (Aiyar et al., 2015; ECB, 2016). This translates into a 
                                                             
25 In Appendix B, we show that during the euro sovereign crisis, banks reduce more or increase relatively less their loan loss 
reserves and coverage ratios when asset quality deteriorates.  
26 Although at different rates, the majority of EA countries “acknowledge tax deductions for LLPs, write -offs and collateral 
sales”. (ECB, 2016 and 2017b). 
27 We are aware of the fact that the characteristics of collateral (Constâncio, 2017; Bruno and Carletti, 2017).  Due to lack of 
data, we are unable to control for these aspects explicitly.  
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generally reduced ability to resolve NPLs. It follows that national and supranational supervisors may 
want to exercise a more severe scrutiny on banks from high-NPL jurisdictions, and require them to step 
up efforts to strengthen their balance sheet.28 Any intervention to improve the institutional setting 
would result into a stronger reaction by banks located in these countries. 
To investigate whether this is the case, we interact the high-NPL country dummy with our 
proxies for country governance. We do find support for a different behavior at banks from weaker 
countries. Unlike in the baseline specification, actions to improve the rule of law are associated with 
lower NPLs in banks from risky jurisdiction, indicating that that better quality enforcement or more 
efficient courts are relatively more beneficial for NPL resolution in high-NPL countries. In one 
specification (Column 6), stricter rule of law is also related to lower coverage ratio. This evidence 
suggests lower reserve needs or larger drawdowns associated with more intense NPL resolution. 
Looking at the various macroprudential measures, the implementation of capital surcharges and 
loan-to-value caps seems to have a different impact in high-NPL countries. In particular, additional 
capital buffers in large institutions (SIFI) are associated with lower coverage ratios and lower NPLs 
(Columns 2, 4, and 6). This finding supports previous research on the effect of stricter capital rules on 
banks’ behavior (Gropp et al., 2019). Complying with stricter capital rules make deleveraging and de-
risking strategies more likely in banks from High-NPL countries. To reinforce the mechanism, banks 
subject to stricter binding capital rules (such as SIFIs) would have a higher incentive to retain earnings 
(to comply with the new rules) rather than to increase provisioning. Finally, we find that increasing loan 
collateralization by setting limits to the borrowers’ loan-to-value ratio is associated with higher coverage 
ratios in high-NPL countries, indicating that collateral and coverage ratios are complementary rather 
than substitute tools to strengthen bank balance sheets.   
5.2 The role of the NPL secondary market 
One the responses most often cited by the banks as impediments to the NPL resolution is the 
lack of a market for NPLs (EBA, 2019). Although still underdeveloped, however, NPLs transactions have 
progressively increased over the last years, varying from 11 billion euros in 2010 to nearly 100 billion 
                                                             
28 The policies and practices in jurisdictions not afflicted by high NPLs “are not expected to be as prescriptive or coordinated  a s 
those in jurisdictions currently reacting to high levels of NPLs”. ECB (2016) 
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euros as of end 2017, according to PwC reports.29 Transactions are concentrated in a few countries, i.e., 
the UK, Germany, Spain, Ireland, and more recently, Italy (the largest market place since 2016). Figure  5 
shows the value of NPL transactions by countries in 2010–2017.   
The level of development and liquidity of the secondary markets for distressed loans is another 
feature that may explain variation in coverage ratios. The secondary market for troubled assets is a 
market for lemons à la Akerlof, being characterized by high information asymmetries and large bid-ask 
spreads between sellers and buyers (Fell et al., 2016). We expect deeper markets to incentivize banks to 
accumulate larger reserves and henceforth higher coverage ratios, as a pre-condition to access the 
market (see also the discussion in Section 2).  
To test this hypothesis, in Table 7, we expand our micro-macro baseline regression to account 
for the relevance of the NPL secondary market in a given country. We first measure the share of NPL 
transactions over the total banking assets at the country level to proxy the degree of development of 
the market (Columns 1 to 3). Because the volume of trades is concentrated only in some countries 
(Ireland, Spain, Germany and Italy)30, we also include two categorical variables to account for medium 
and large secondary markets, by splitting the sample into terciles–based on the share of NPL 
transactions over the total banking assets at country level. We use the lowest tercile as the reference 
category and test whether the other categories are associated with higher coverage ratios.   
We find that coverage ratios and LLRs are significantly higher in countries where the NPL 
secondary market is large enough, i.e. where markets are at least medium-sized (Columns 4 to 6). The 
effect is larger in countries that are characterized by both high NPLs and a large NPL secondary market  
(Columns 7 to 8). This is not surprising, as information asymmetries are accentuated in high-NPL 
countries and, therefore, banks may need higher coverage ratios to possibly access the market. 
6. Conclusions  
This paper explores the main determinants of coverage ratio, an indicator of bank balance sheet 
strength that has gained increasing importance in Europe in the last few years. Using a sample of over 
440 medium and large sized banks in the EA, we try to disentangle micro and macro factors affecting 
coverage ratios and their components. 
                                                             
29 The EC’s package of measure to tackle high NPLs presented in March 2018 includes initiatives to encourage the development  
of secondary markets, such as a proposal for a directive aiming to harmonize requirements and creat e a single market for credit 
servicers and buyers.  
30 The dataset also includes transactions for France (2012), Belgium (2013), Netherlands (2013, 2015 and 2016), and Greece 
(2016) but for more limited amounts.  
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Our analysis reveals some interesting findings. Credit risk considerations are the most relevant 
bank-specific factors explaining coverage ratios. A deterioration in asset quality is associated with higher 
coverage ratios, but the relation is not linear, becoming positive when banks hold very large stock of 
troubled assets. Moreover, coverage ratios incorporate forward-looking indicators of credit risk. 
Independently of these characteristics, banks adjust their coverage ratios to catch up with their peers, 
and the more so, the more they are distant (below) from their target.  
Coverage ratios increase with GDP growth, and decrease in recession, pointing to a 
countercyclical behavior. More stringent macroprudential policy is also associated with higher coverage 
ratios. Interventions on time-varying/dynamic loan-loss provisioning and corporate taxation are 
generally the most effective tools to increase coverage ratios. Structural factors such as the degree of 
development of NPL secondary markets also explain coverage ratio variation, where larger markets are 
associated with higher coverage ratios.  
High-NPL banks as well as banks from high-NPL countries behave differently from banks less 
affected by credit risk issues. In banks more exposed to credit risk, capitalization and coverage ratio 
appear as being complementary (rather than substitute) tools, where one reinforces the other. In more 
risky countries actions to improve the rule of law are associated with lower NPLs, indicating that a 
stronger contract enforcement or more efficient courts help banks resolve NPLs. The role of developed 
NPL secondary market is more accentuated in banks from risky jurisdictions.  
Our results are relevant for the current debate. They show that the role played by macro drivers 
of coverage ratios could help policy makers in clarifying which levers may be the most effective to reach 
the desired level of loss coverage. Stricter supervision is relevant, but addressing structural factors (e.g., 
by developing the secondary market for loans or reinforcing the legal framework) is at least equally 
important to ease the disposal of legacy assets, hence reducing the denominator of the ratio more 
quickly and at a lower cost. Another major policy implication is that in relatively more fragile banks 
complying with tighter capital rules could come at the expense of coverage ratios.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Average coverage ratio for all banks and banks from high-NPL 
countries (percentages, 2010 – 2017, source: Authors’ calculations) 
 
 
Figure 2: Average loan loss reserves over total assets (LLR/TA) and average 
non-performing loans over total assets (NPL/TA) (percentages,2010-2017, 
source: Authors’ calculations) 
 
Figure 3: Range and average (unconditional mean, percentages) of non-
performing loans over total assets (NPL/TA). The lines present the complete 
range of NPL/TA in a certain country. The diamond is the country mean (over 
the time period 2010-2017). (Source: Authors’ calculations) 
 
 
Figure 4: Range and average (unconditional mean, percentages) of the 
coverage ratio. The lines present the complete range of the coverage ratio in a 
certain country. The diamond is the country mean (over the time period 2010-
2017). (Source: Authors’ calculations) 
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Figure 5: Secondary loan market transaction data (2010–2017, € billions, source: PwC) 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correlations between LLP/TA and coverage ratio. Correlations with a * are significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
LLPs LLPs(t-1) LLPs(t-2) Coverage ratio Coverage ratio (t-1) Coverage ratio (t-2) 
LLPs 1 
     
LLPs(t-1) 0.946* 1 
    
LLPs(t-2) 0.920* 0.942* 1 
   
Coverage ratio -0.029 -0.033 -0.064 1 
  
Coverage ratio (t-1) -0.025 -0.026 -0.050 0.922* 1 
 
Coverage ratio (t-2) -0.063 -0.056 -0.049 0.869* 0.929* 1 
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Table 2: Summary statistics. This table gives summary statistics for the baseline regression sample.  
 
  mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max 
Total Assets (in thousands) 
                    
27,938,084  
                    
50,759,773  
                    
1,681,596  
                    
2,018,164  
                    
5,777,488  
                     
117,200,765  
                     
174,314,000  
Coverage ratio 0.51 0.17 0.10 0.29 0.51 0.72 0.89 
LLR / TA 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 
NPL / TA 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.22 
Gross loans / TA 0.65 0.13 0.29 0.46 0.67 0.81 0.89 
Deposits / TA 0.66 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.71 0.83 0.91 
ROAA 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
CET1 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.37 
DELTA (NPL / TA) 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Gross loan growth 0.03 0.07 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 0.09 0.27 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.65 0.12 0.36 0.50 0.66 0.79 0.94 
Real GDP growth rate  0.02 0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.25 
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.28 
House price change (y-o-y) 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.07 0.08 
Stock price change (y-o-y) 0.09 0.12 -0.25 -0.07 0.09 0.27 0.29 
Private sector credit / GDP 0.90 0.28 0.26 0.77 0.82 1.32 2.45 
Short-term interest rate 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Rule of Law  1.40 0.55 -0.11 0.38 1.62 1.86 2.10 
Regulatory quality 1.43 0.44 0.15 0.71 1.69 1.82 2.05 
Macroprudential Index 3.15 1.10 0.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 
Dynamic loan-loss provisioning 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Levy/Tax on FI 0.78 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Size secondary loan mkt / TA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 
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Table 3: Micro-level baseline regressions: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. This table reports estimation 
results from the panel fixed-effects micro-level regressions. The dependent variables are the coverage ratio, LLRs/TA, and NPLs/TA at the bank 
level. Coverage ratio is defined as LLRs/NPLs. Country-time, and bank dummies are included in each regression. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
  Baseline  Forward Looking High NPL Banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  NPLs/TA LLRs/TA 
Coverage 
ratio LLRs/TA 
Coverage 
ratio LLRs/TA 
Coverage 
ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
 
0.295*** -0.898*** 0.355*** -0.028 0.331*** -1.617*** 
  
(0.035) (0.275) (0.023) (0.235) (0.034) (0.360) 
DELTA (NPL / TA) (t) 
 
0.295*** -1.266*** 0.330*** -0.817*** 0.310*** -1.274*** 
  
(0.039) (0.304) (0.036) (0.303) (0.037) (0.292) 
Gross Loans/TA (t-1) 0.079*** 0.010 -0.007 -0.003 -0.088 0.011 -0.003 
 
(0.021) (0.007) (0.097) (0.005) (0.074) (0.007) (0.097) 
Deposits/TA (t-1) -0.016 0.003 0.134* 0.009* 0.076 0.004 0.106 
 
(0.019) (0.005) (0.080) (0.005) (0.081) (0.005) (0.078) 
ROAA (t-1) -1.260*** -0.273*** -2.062*** -0.101 -0.415 -0.279*** -1.111 
 
(0.241) (0.088) (0.715) (0.085) (0.781) (0.089) (0.942) 
CET1 (t-1) 0.032 0.011 0.275 0.015 0.274 0.003 0.270 
 
(0.026) (0.009) (0.172) (0.011) (0.168) (0.009) (0.171) 
Log(TA) (t-1) -0.004 -0.001 0.055 0.000 -0.034 -0.001 0.056 
 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.038) (0.002) (0.032) (0.002) (0.038) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.031** 0.008** 0.176*** 0.006 0.052 0.007* 0.178*** 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.043) (0.005) (0.052) (0.004) (0.042) 
Cost-to-income ratio (t-1) -0.025*** -0.002 -0.059 -0.005* -0.071 -0.001 -0.054 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.039) (0.003) (0.043) (0.003) (0.037) 
DELTA (NPL / TA) (t+1) 
   
0.016 1.119*** 
  
    
(0.028) (0.266) 
  High NPL dummy (t-1) 
     
-0.005 -0.168*** 
      
(0.006) (0.059) 
High NPL dummy * NPL/TA (t-1) 
     
-0.080* 1.013** 
      
(0.044) (0.397) 
High NPL dummy * ROAA (t-1) 
     
-0.152 -2.711** 
      
(0.176) (1.266) 
High NPL dummy * CET1 (t-1) 
     
0.132*** 0.717* 
      
(0.042) (0.399) 
Constant 0.076 0.016 -0.417 -0.004 1.068* 0.015 -0.393 
 
(0.169) (0.038) (0.629) (0.040) (0.544) (0.039) (0.639) 
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1251 1251 1845 1845 
No. of banks 441 441 441 348 348 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944 0.968 0.837 0.977 0.870 0.969 0.840 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.133 0.520 0.060 0.615 0.057 0.543 0.078 
FE Bank Yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
FE Country * Year Yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
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Table 4: Micro-level regressions herding behavior: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. This table reports 
estimation results from the panel fixed-effects OLS micro-level regressions. The dependent variables are the change in coverage ratio, 
LLRs/NPLs (t) – LLRs/NPLs (t-1), the change in LLRs/TA, LLRs/TA (t) – LLR/TA (t-1), and the change in NPLs/TA, NPLs/TA (t) – NPLs/TA (t-1). 
Country-time, and bank dummies are included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank -level and reported in 
parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Delta NPLs/TA Delta LLRs/TA Delta Coverage ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
 
-0.036** -0.177 
  
(0.016) (0.147) 
DELTA (NPL / TA) (t) 
 
0.270*** -1.770*** 
  
(0.031) (0.246) 
Gross Loans/TA (t-1) -0.016 -0.009** -0.055 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.058) 
Deposits/TA (t-1) -0.012 -0.009** 0.092* 
 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.053) 
ROAA (t-1) -0.025 -0.083 -0.792 
 
(0.174) (0.074) (0.547) 
CET1 (t-1) -0.041** 0.006 0.307*** 
 
(0.020) (0.006) (0.114) 
Log(TA) (t-1) 0.012** -0.001 0.057*** 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.022) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.006 0.010** 0.161*** 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.038) 
Cost-to-income ratio (t-1) -0.008 -0.005* -0.023 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.026) 
Below Country Avg. Dummy (t-1) -0.002 0.001 0.016*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Absolute Deviation from Country Avg. (t-1)  0.014*** -0.009*** -0.465*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.038) 
Abs. Deviation * Below Country Avg. 
Dummy (t-1)  -0.029*** 0.028*** 0.724*** 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.075) 
Constant -0.166 0.032 -0.914** 
 
(0.101) (0.027) (0.372) 
Observations 1814 1814 1814 
No. of banks 436 436 436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.428 0.643 0.300 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.039 0.351 0.305 
FE bank yes  yes  yes  
FE country year yes  yes  yes  
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Table 5: Micro-macro regressions: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. This table reports estimation results 
from the panel fixed-effects micro-macro regressions. The dependent variables are the coverage ratio, LLRs/TA, and NPLs/TA at the bank level. 
A set of bank and time dummies are included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level (high-NPL countries). 
Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  NPLs/TA NPLs/TA LLRs/TA LLRs/TA 
Coverage 
ratio 
Coverage 
ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
  
0.305*** 0.301*** -0.746*** -0.809*** 
   
(0.036) (0.036) (0.238) (0.242) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.033** -0.029** 0,003 0,003 0.125*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.042) (0.041) 
Short-term interest rate (t-1) -0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.013 -0.018 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) 
Real GDP growth rate (t-1) 0.000 -0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.008** 0.008** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment rate  (t-1) 0.536*** 0.460*** 0.109*** 0.094** 0.334 0.218 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.039) (0.039) (0.363) (0.358) 
House price change (y-o-y)  (t-1) -0.023 -0.013 -0.001 -0.005 -0.014 -0.033 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.132) (0.129) 
Stock price change (y-o-y)  (t-1) 0.016** 0.014* 0.002 0.002 0.011 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.030) 
Private sector credit / GDP  (t-1) 0.030* 0.034* 0.001 -0.005 0.119* 0.060 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.064) (0.070) 
Regulatory Quality  -0.005 0.001 -0.005** -0.003 -0.054 -0.032 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.036) (0.038) 
Rule of Law  -0.016 -0.015 0.005 0.006* 0.015 0.027 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.036) (0.036) 
Macroprudential Index 0.001 
 
0.001* 
 
0.012** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.006) 
 
Dynamic loan-loss provisioning 
 
-0.007 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.069** 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.032) 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 
 
-0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.015) 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.002 
 
0.028** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.012) 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps 
 
0.007* 
 
0.001 
 
0.010 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.015) 
Constant -0.181 -0.160 0.011 0.017 -0.528 -0.519 
 
(0.157) (0.156) (0.041) (0.040) (0.580) (0.571) 
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 
No. of banks 441 441 441 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.933 0.935 0.961 0.962 0.833 0.834 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.338 0.357 0.661 0.668 0.080 0.086 
FE Bank yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
FE Year yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
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Table 6: Micro-macro regressions: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. This table reports estimation results 
from the panel fixed-effects micro-macro regressions. Macroeconomic indexes are interacted with an indicator for high-NPL countries. High-
NPL countries are defined as countries with NPL/TA above the sample mean. A set of bank and time dummies are included in each regression. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level (high-NPL countries). Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by  ***, **, and * 
respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  NPLs/TA NPLs/TA LLRs/TA LLRs/TA 
Coverage 
ratio 
Coverage 
ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
  
0.289*** 0.281*** -0.570** -0.673*** 
   
(0.037) (0.038) (0.237) (0.244) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.025** -0.019** 0,004 0,004 0.124*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.041) (0.041) 
Short-term interest rate (t-1) -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.016 -0.020 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.024) 
Real GDP growth rate per country (t-1) 0.000 -0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.009** 0.008** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.519*** 0.448*** 0.116*** 0.102** 0.173 0.116 
 
(0.088) (0.089) (0.039) (0.040) (0.352) (0.350) 
House price change (y-o-y) (t-1) -0.012 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.050 -0.055 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.011) (0.010) (0.132) (0.128) 
Stock price change (y-o-y) (t-1) 0.014** 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.014 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.030) 
Private sector credit / GDP (t-1) 0.036** 0.044*** 0.002 -0.004 0.107* 0.051 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.063) (0.071) 
High NPL Country Dummy 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.005* 0.004* 0.011 -0.019 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.026) (0.023) 
Regulatory Quality -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.058 -0.050 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.039) (0.041) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Reg. Quality -0.006 0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.049 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.036) (0.038) 
Rule of Law  -0.014 -0.012 0.004 0.006 0.047 0.066* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.038) (0.039) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Rule of Law -0.011* -0.018** -0.001 -0.001 -0.043 -0.065** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.030) (0.032) 
Macroprudential Index 0.002 
 
0.001* 
 
0.014** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.006) 
 High NPL Country Dummy * Macropru Index -0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.003 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.005) 
 Dynamic loan-loss provisioning 
 
-0.017** 
 
0.006 
 
0.095** 
  
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.042) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Dynamic LLP 
 
0.011 
 
0.002 
 
-0.049 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.046) 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.008 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.015) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Capital Surcharges  
 
-0.006*** 
 
0.001 
 
-0.021** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.010) 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions 
 
0.006** 
 
0.002 
 
0.030** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.013) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Levy/Tax on FI 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.014) 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.016) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Loan-to-Value Caps 
 
0.013*** 
 
0.001 
 
0.031** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.016) 
Constant -0.147 -0.106 0.004 0.011 -0.447 -0.406 
 
(0.148) (0.144) (0.039) (0.039) (0.581) (0.570) 
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Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 
No. of banks 441 441 441 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944 0.948 0.962 0.963 0.839 0.841 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.448 0.485 0.668 0.675 0.110 0.121 
FE Bank yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
FE Year yes yes yes yes Yes yes 
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Table 7: Micro-macro regressions, secondary NPL market transactions: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. 
This table reports estimation results from the OLS micro-macro regressions. The dependent variables are the coverage ratio, LLRs/TA, and 
NPLs/TA at the bank level. A set of time and bank dummies are included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-
level. Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  NPLs/TA LLR/TA 
Coverage 
ratio NPLs/TA LLR/TA 
Coverage 
ratio NPLs/TA LLR/TA 
Coverage 
ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
 
0.302*** -0.782*** 
 
0.303*** -0.747*** 
 
0.292*** -0.515** 
  
(0.035) (0.236) 
 
(0.035) (0.237) 
 
(0.036) (0.238) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.035*** 0.003 0.127*** -0.033** 0,004 0.129*** -0.028** 0,004 0.126*** 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.042) (0.013) (0.004) (0.042) (0.011) (0.004) (0.042) 
Short-term interest rate (t-1) -0.217 0.103 0.376 -0.383 0.075 -0.351 -0.207 0.095 -0.653 
 
(0.731) (0.203) (2.340) (0.743) (0.206) (2.353) (0.692) (0.201) (2.352) 
Real GDP growth rate(t-1) 0.003 0.067** 0.837** 0.056 0.080** 0.920** 0.047 0.080** 0.982** 
 
(0.085) (0.034) (0.405) (0.084) (0.033) (0.418) (0.080) (0.033) (0.409) 
Unemployment rate  (t-1) 0.564*** 0.090** 0.414 0.575*** 0.104*** 0.452 0.594*** 0.114*** 0.276 
 
(0.088) (0.037) (0.341) (0.090) (0.040) (0.367) (0.080) (0.040) (0.353) 
House price change (y-o-y)  (t-1) -0.031 -0.012 -0.066 -0.012 -0.004 -0.021 0.004 -0.003 -0.054 
 
(0.031) (0.010) (0.134) (0.031) (0.011) (0.135) (0.029) (0.011) (0.136) 
Stock price change (y-o-y)  (t-1) 0.017** 0.002 0.007 0.018** 0.002 0.008 0.016** 0.002 0.008 
 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.029) (0.007) (0.002) (0.030) (0.007) (0.002) (0.030) 
Private sector credit / GDP  (t-1) 0.025 -0.001 0.103 0.032** 0.002 0.114* 0.036*** 0.002 0.097 
 
(0.016) (0.006) (0.064) (0.015) (0.005) (0.065) (0.014) (0.005) (0.065) 
Size secondary loan mkt / TA 0.315 0.160** 0.748 
      
 
(0.252) (0.069) (0.717) 
      Size secondary mkt / TA Tercile 2  
   
0.004* 0.001** 0.019** 0.004* 0.002** 0.015 
    
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) 
Size secondary mkt/ TA Tercile 3 
   
0.007*** 0.002*** 0.021** 0.006*** 0.001* 0.010 
    
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) 
High NPL Country Dummy 
      
0.015*** 0.001 -0.050*** 
       
(0.002) (0.001) (0.010) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Tercile 3 
      
0.001 0.000 0.008 
       
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011) 
High NPL Country Dummy * Tercile 3 
      
0.004 0.002** 0.024** 
       
(0.002) (0.001) (0.010) 
Constant -0.175 0.027 -0.301 -0.215 0.007 -0.625 -0.213 0.000 -0.568 
 
(0.159) (0.041) (0.559) (0.156) (0.039) (0.558) (0.144) (0.039) (0.559) 
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 
No. of banks 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.933 0.961 0.831 0.933 0.961 0.832 0.942 0.962 0.837 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.340 0.663 0.066 0.342 0.660 0.077 0.423 0.665 0.103 
FE Bank yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
FE Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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APPENDIX A1- Additional tables 
 
Table A.1: Sample composition and average coverage, LLR/TA and NPL/TA ratios by country. 
Country Code Avg. Coverage Ratio Avg. LLR/TA Avg. NPL/TA 
AT 53% 2% 4% 
BE 47% 1% 2% 
BG 32% 5% 13% 
CY 41% 9% 20% 
CZ 63% 3% 4% 
DE 54% 1% 2% 
DK 55% 4% 7% 
ES 56% 2% 5% 
FI 34% 0% 1% 
FR 63% 1% 2% 
GB 36% 1% 4% 
GR 42% 9% 21% 
HR 57% 6% 11% 
HU 66% 9% 16% 
IE 36% 6% 16% 
IT 44% 5% 10% 
LT 27% 1% 4% 
LU 32% 1% 4% 
LV 54% 2% 4% 
MT 27% 1% 4% 
NL 31% 1% 4% 
PL 59% 3% 6% 
PT 54% 5% 10% 
RO 56% 4% 8% 
SE 72% 1% 1% 
SI 66% 6% 9% 
SK 65% 3% 4% 
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Table A.2: Correlation matrix. 
  
Coverage 
ratio 
LLR / TA NPL / TA 
Log(Total 
Assets) 
Gross 
loans / TA 
Deposits / 
TA ROAA CET1 
DELTA 
(NPL / 
TA) 
Gross 
loan 
growth 
Cost-to-
income 
ratio 
Coverage ratio 1 0.02 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 -0.16 0.07 -0.03 
LLR / TA 0.02 1 0.94 0.09 0.21 -0.19 -0.20 -0.14 0.26 -0.26 -0.10 
NPL / TA -0.23 0.94 1 0.11 0.22 -0.24 -0.27 -0.17 0.34 -0.30 -0.10 
Log(Total Assets) -0.12 0.09 0.11 1 -0.07 -0.50 -0.04 -0.18 -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 
Gross loans / TA -0.12 0.21 0.22 -0.07 1 0.09 -0.04 -0.16 0.07 0.01 0.03 
Deposits / TA 0.12 -0.19 -0.24 -0.50 0.09 1 0.07 0.19 -0.16 0.22 0.14 
ROAA 0.13 -0.20 -0.27 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 1 0.23 -0.36 0.30 -0.41 
CET1 0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 0.19 0.23 1 -0.13 0.05 -0.18 
DELTA (NPL / TA) -0.16 0.26 0.34 -0.01 0.07 -0.16 -0.36 -0.13 1 -0.09 -0.01 
Gross loan growth 0.07 -0.26 -0.30 -0.14 0.01 0.22 0.30 0.05 -0.09 1 -0.11 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 0.03 0.14 -0.41 -0.18 -0.01 -0.11 1 
Real GDP growth rate  0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 0.24 0.16 -0.38 0.10 0.01 
Unemployment rate -0.09 0.55 0.55 0.29 0.06 -0.30 -0.08 -0.13 0.21 -0.12 -0.16 
House price change  0.21 -0.39 -0.45 -0.18 -0.05 0.39 0.13 0.23 -0.39 0.10 0.11 
Stock price change  0.10 -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.04 0.17 0.09 0.11 -0.06 0.01 0.03 
Private sector credit / GDP -0.19 0.13 0.18 0.32 0.04 -0.24 -0.13 -0.07 0.14 -0.09 -0.10 
Short-term interest rate -0.11 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.01 -0.12 0.08 -0.23 0.13 0.01 -0.11 
Rule of Law 0.09 -0.63 -0.62 -0.05 -0.08 0.18 0.02 0.13 -0.24 0.05 0.12 
Regulatory Quality 0.05 -0.65 -0.63 -0.16 -0.05 0.29 -0.01 0.16 -0.20 0.09 0.16 
Macroprudential Index 0.23 0.02 -0.06 -0.16 -0.01 0.13 0.11 0.19 -0.17 0.09 0.03 
Dynamic LLP 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.13 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.11 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.23 -0.18 0.11 0.07 
Levy/Tax on FI 0.26 -0.23 -0.30 -0.22 -0.11 0.20 -0.07 0.12 -0.22 0.00 0.22 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps -0.01 0.43 0.40 0.12 0.00 -0.20 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 
Size secondary mkt / TA -0.08 0.28 0.29 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
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Continued (Table A.2: Correlation matrix) 
  
Real 
GDP 
growth 
rate  
Unempl
oyment 
rate 
House 
price 
change  
Stock 
price 
change  
Private 
sector 
credit / 
GDP 
Short-
term 
interes
t rate 
Rule of 
Law 
Regul
atory 
Qualit
y 
Macro
pruden
tial 
Index 
Dyna
mic 
LLP 
Capital 
Surchar
ges on 
SIFIs 
Levy/
Tax 
on FI 
Loan-
to-
Value 
Caps 
Size 
secondary 
mkt / TA 
Coverage ratio 0.08 -0.09 0.21 0.10 -0.19 -0.11 0.09 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.12 0.26 -0.01 -0.08 
LLR / TA -0.11 0.55 -0.39 -0.18 0.13 0.13 -0.63 -0.65 0.02 0.09 -0.14 -0.23 0.43 0.28 
NPL / TA -0.15 0.55 -0.45 -0.20 0.18 0.15 -0.62 -0.63 -0.06 0.06 -0.17 -0.30 0.40 0.29 
Log(Total Assets) -0.01 0.29 -0.18 -0.18 0.32 0.19 -0.05 -0.16 -0.16 0.11 -0.11 -0.22 0.12 0.07 
Gross loans / TA -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.07 
Deposits / TA 0.22 -0.30 0.39 0.17 -0.24 -0.12 0.18 0.29 0.13 -0.01 0.18 0.20 -0.20 -0.07 
ROAA 0.24 -0.08 0.13 0.09 -0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.07 0.18 0.02 
CET1 0.16 -0.13 0.23 0.11 -0.07 -0.23 0.13 0.16 0.19 -0.06 0.23 0.12 -0.03 0.00 
DELTA (NPL / TA) -0.38 0.21 -0.39 -0.06 0.14 0.13 -0.24 -0.20 -0.17 -0.03 -0.18 -0.22 -0.01 -0.05 
Gross loan growth 0.10 -0.12 0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.01 -0.16 0.11 0.03 -0.10 -0.11 0.12 0.16 0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.22 -0.18 -0.02 
Real GDP growth rate  1 -0.27 0.57 -0.09 -0.17 -0.13 0.26 0.30 0.31 -0.06 0.30 0.28 0.11 0.31 
Unemployment rate -0.27 1 -0.55 -0.25 0.32 0.12 -0.66 -0.77 0.00 0.53 -0.21 -0.34 0.45 0.23 
House price change  0.57 -0.55 1 0.11 -0.27 -0.45 0.55 0.61 0.39 -0.13 0.42 0.48 -0.18 -0.04 
Stock price change  -0.09 -0.25 0.11 1 -0.24 -0.20 0.16 0.19 0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.24 -0.18 -0.02 
Private sector credit / GDP -0.17 0.32 -0.27 -0.24 1 0.09 0.13 0.05 -0.36 0.20 -0.15 -0.50 0.16 -0.04 
Short-term interest rate -0.13 0.12 -0.45 -0.20 0.09 1 -0.15 -0.21 -0.51 0.10 -0.51 -0.47 -0.03 -0.12 
Rule of Law 0.26 -0.66 0.55 0.16 0.13 -0.15 1 0.92 -0.17 -0.19 0.01 0.28 -0.42 -0.22 
Regulatory Quality 0.30 -0.77 0.61 0.19 0.05 -0.21 0.92 1 -0.08 -0.24 0.17 0.27 -0.48 -0.17 
Macroprudential Index 0.31 0.00 0.39 0.02 -0.36 -0.51 -0.17 -0.08 1 0.10 0.68 0.50 0.39 0.09 
Dynamic LLP -0.06 0.53 -0.13 -0.10 0.20 0.10 -0.19 -0.24 0.10 1 -0.14 -0.20 0.21 0.02 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs 0.30 -0.21 0.42 0.03 -0.15 -0.51 0.01 0.17 0.68 -0.14 1 0.25 0.11 0.05 
Levy/Tax on FI 0.28 -0.34 0.48 0.24 -0.50 -0.47 0.28 0.27 0.50 -0.20 0.25 1 -0.08 -0.01 
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Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps 0.11 0.45 -0.18 -0.18 0.16 -0.03 -0.42 -0.48 0.39 0.21 0.11 -0.08 1 0.26 
Size secondary loan 
market / TA 0.31 0.23 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 -0.17 0.09 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.26 1.00 
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Table A.3: Micro-level regressions robustness: Determinants of coverage ratios and components of coverage ratios. This table reports 
estimation results from the OLS micro-level regressions with bank, and country-year fixed effects. The dependent variables are the coverage 
ratio, defined as LLR/NPLs. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank -level and reported in parentheses. NPL/TA is replaced with NPLs 
over gross loans (NPL/GL), which is the most commonly used measure of lending portfolio quality.  The CET1 ratio is replaced by the Tier 1 
Capital ratio. ROAA is replaced with the return-on-equity (ROAE). Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  NPLs/TA LLRs/TA Coverage ratio 
NPL/Gross Loans (t-1) 
 
0.188*** -0.594*** 
  
(0.024) (0.172) 
DELTA (NPL / TA) (t) 
 
0.292*** -1.231*** 
  
(0.039) (0.293) 
Gross Loans/TA (t-1) 0.076*** 0.033*** -0.089 
 
(0.021) (0.006) (0.092) 
Deposits/TA (t-1) -0.012 0.004 0.135* 
 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.080) 
ROAE (t-1) -0.105*** -0.019*** -0.185*** 
 
(0.019) (0.007) (0.055) 
Tier 1 Capital (t-1) 0.029 0.009 0.216 
 
(0.028) (0.010) (0.173) 
Log(TA) (t-1) -0.003 0.000 0.049 
 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.038) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.029** 0.009** 0.178*** 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.044) 
Cost-to-income ratio (t-1) -0.025*** -0.001 -0.061 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.039) 
Constant 0.061 -0.024 -0.262 
 
(0.165) (0.041) (0.634) 
Observations 1842 1842 1842 
No. of banks 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944 0.967 0.836 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.144 0.505 0.059 
FE Bank yes Yes yes 
FE Country * Year yes Yes yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
APPENDIX B – The euro sovereign crisis and the advent of the SSM  
 
In this part we consider whether coverage-ratio variation can be attributed to two major events that 
occurred in Europe between 2010 and 2016: the euro sovereign crisis years (2010–12) and the 
commencement of the SSM as of November 2014.  
Table A4 (Columns 1 to 3), provides evidence on how a crisis shock affect loan loss coverage 
policy. In most countries affected by system-wide increases in NPLs, these were linked to the severe 
economic recession that followed the European sovereign debt crisis (ESRB, 2019). To account for the 
euro sovereign crisis, we remove the year fixed effects and include a crisis dummy (signaling the years 
2010-2012) and its interactions with asset quality, capitalization, and profitability. In Columns 4 to 6, a 
negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level is attached to the interaction of asset quality and the 
crisis dummy. This implies that, compared to normal times, in crisis years banks reduced more or 
increased relatively less their loan loss reserves and coverage ratios when asset quality deteriorates. 
This evidence suggests that in times of severe distress it is more difficult (costly) for banks to 
accumulate large provisions to offset increased bad loans, one may expect coverage ratios to decrease. 
It is also possible that regulators tend to be more lenient in bad times and that discretion over 
accounting rules combined with regulatory forbearance may lead banks to understate balance sheet 
stresses by under-reserving to preserve bank capital (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012). 
Next, we investigate the role of the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM). 
This has been a significant institutional change in the euro area, resulting in a common and more 
stringent supervision (Ristolainen, 2018; Eber and Minoiu, 2016).  
Several studies have investigated the role of supervision on the way banks build up loan loss 
coverages. Empirical evidence confirms that supervisory and regulatory practices influence provisioning 
and loan loss allowances (Barth et al., 2013; Laurin and Majnoni, 2003; Yang, 2017; Nicoletti, 2018; 
Gallemore, 2018). According to an IMF survey on obstacles to NPL resolution, the robustness of 
coverage ratios appears to be linked to the stringency of supervision (Aiyar et al., 2017). 36  
                                                             
36 The survey focuses on countries where the aggregate NPL ratio over 2008–2014 exceeded 10% and reflects the views of 
authorities as well as banks operating in those countries. See Aiyar et al. (2015) for the main outcomes of the survey.  
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In Table A4 (Columns 4 to 6), we show the results of a specification which includes the dummy 
POST SSM (taking the value of 1 from 2014 onwards) and the interacted term SSM x POST to account for 
ECB supervised banks since the inception of the single supervisor.  37 Our sample does not include the 
subsidiaries, parents, and ultimate parents of these banks, as they could have also changed their 
provisioning policies in anticipation of the assessment or after it, while not formally showing up as banks 
under SSM supervision. The dummy post enters with a positive and significant coefficient in the LLR-
ratio regression, indicating a generalized, more prudent provisioning since the advent of the SSM. The 
estimated coefficient of the interacted term on the asset quality and the coverage ratio is positive and 
statistically significant (at the 5% and the 10% level, respectively). This finding confirms (e.g., Ristolainen, 
2018) that supervised banks have overall more incentives to recognize NPLs and (to a lower extent) 
adjust loan-loss coverage accordingly, a plausible effect of the closer scrutiny and the application of 
more stringent classification criteria.38  
However, we are aware that these coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, as we 
cannot include time fixed effects in this regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
38 An important step in the preparation of the SSM was the ass et quality exercise carried out by the ECB in 2014 on a sub-
sample of European banks that were subjected to stricter classification criteria and in -depth credit file scrutiny (Bruno and 
Marino, 2019). The review led to additional NPLs of euro 136 billion (+18%) and provisions of euro 48 billion (+12%), as an 
effect of the consistent application of the EBA restrictive approach to defining non performing exposures and the credit file  
review (ECB, 2014). More recently (see Section 2 for details), the ECB has introduced additional measures promoting more 
prudent provisioning and higher coverage ratios in supervised entities.  
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Table A4: Micro-level regressions extensions: Influence of the single supervisory mechanism and EA crisis. This table reports estimation results 
from the panel fixed-effects micro-level regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and reported in parentheses. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, 
**, and * respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  NPLs/TA LLRs/TA Coverage ratio NPLs/TA LLRs/TA Coverage ratio 
NPL/TA (t-1) 
 
0.357*** -0.393** 
 
0.348*** -0.519** 
  
(0.023) (0.181) 
 
(0.030) (0.204) 
DELTA (NPL / TA) (t) 
 
0.276*** -1.270*** 
 
0.264*** -1.341*** 
  
(0.037) (0.255) 
 
(0.041) (0.269) 
Gross Loans/TA (t-1) 0.018 -0.004 -0.079 0.017 -0.012** -0.149* 
 
(0.021) (0.006) (0.077) (0.021) (0.006) (0.078) 
Deposits/TA (t-1) 0.003 0.009* 0.204*** 0.008 0.013** 0.230*** 
 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.063) (0.019) (0.006) (0.070) 
ROAA (t-1) -1.862*** -0.199** -2.046*** -1.890*** -0.224** -2.175*** 
 
(0.332) (0.080) (0.718) (0.335) (0.088) (0.707) 
CET1 (t-1) -0.089*** 0.005 0.387*** -0.072*** 0.006 0.339** 
 
(0.025) (0.010) (0.140) (0.026) (0.011) (0.135) 
Log(TA) (t-1) -0.004 -0.001 0.088*** -0.001 -0.002 0.078** 
 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.031) (0.011) (0.003) (0.032) 
Gross loan growth (t) -0.040*** 0.007 0.154*** -0.043*** 0.004 0.124*** 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.044) (0.014) (0.004) (0.044) 
Cost-to-income ratio (t-1) -0.052*** -0.002 -0.066* -0.051*** -0.002 -0.064* 
 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.039) (0.010) (0.003) (0.039) 
European Crisis Dummy -0.012 0.001 0.013 
   
 
(0.008) (0.002) (0.024) 
   European Crisis Dummy (t) * NPL/TA (t-1) 
 
-0.090*** -0.706*** 
   
  
(0.027) (0.203) 
   European Crisis Dummy (t) * ROAA (t-1) -0.024 -0.251 -1.211 
   
 
(0.464) (0.167) (1.788) 
   European Crisis Dummy (t) * CET (t-1) 0.083 0.017 0.060 
   
 
(0.066) (0.016) (0.197) 
   Post SSM 
   
-0.002 0.001** 0.009 
    
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) 
SSM Bank Dummy * Post SSM 
   
0.011** 0.000 0.027* 
    
(0.005) (0.001) (0.015) 
Constant 0.152 0.013 -0.965* 0.095 0.037 -0.785 
 
(0.169) (0.037) (0.499) (0.167) (0.049) (0.525) 
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 
No. of banks 441 441 441 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.910 0.961 0.830 0.911 0.957 0.827 
Adjusted Within R-squared 0.167 0.680 0.156 0.177 0.649 0.139 
FE Bank Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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